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The Paradox of Religious Neutrality
1. Introduction
Philosopher and theologian Donald Loose argues that western liberal 
democracy is a product of inherently Christian societies. Broadly speaking, 
his reasoning is that owing to the fact that modern secular democracy arose 
in societies marked by Enlightenment, and because Enlightenment arose 
in European societies marked by Christianity, modern secular democracy 
is inevitably and transitively in!uenced by Christianity. Since Christianity 
and democracy are historically intertwined in this way, it may be argued 
that the Christian faith is more compatible with the values of democracy 
than other religions, such as Islam or Judaism. In other words, according 
to Loose, modern secular democracy is biased toward Christianity.
 "is is a bold claim with rami#cations that threaten the very concep-
tion of secularity in modern political thought. In my opinion, such a claim 
should not go unchallenged. For this reason, the purpose of this paper is 
to evaluate to what extent this argument may be countered by alternative 
theories on the relationships between religion and the secular state, within 
the boundaries of the speci#c case of free speech on religious issues, which 
includes expressions of faith and expression of opinions on religions and 
their believers. 
 Although I do not consider myself a proponent of Loose’s account, I 
shall nevertheless grant it signi#cant leeway and view it in the most favour-
able light possible, in order to make a fair assessment of its validity. To 
this end, I shall present two alternative accounts that explicitly support 
the (religious) neutrality of the modern secular state (by Robert Post and 
Ronald Dworkin, respectively), and juxtapose these with Loose’s position. 
In this confrontation, Loose’s account will receive the bene#t of the doubt, 
meaning that it will be treated as valid until proven wrong by the alter-
natives, and that the burden of proof for such a disproval lies with the 
opposing positions.
 One of the implications of this bene#t of the doubt is that if a con-
frontation between Loose’s position and an alternative view amounts to 
nothing more than disagreement without any signi#cant shared argu-
ments or assumptions, this is not su$cient to reject Loose’s position. What 
is necessary for an evaluation of the validity of Loose’s position within 
these con#nes is a minimal degree of compatibility or shared assumptions 
between the two positions, which should then be used to build an argu-
ment leading to the conclusion that one position is more tenable than the 
other.
 In the #rst section of this paper, I shall present Loose’s argument for 
the historical connection between modern secular society and Christian-
ity, as well as his argument that this entails a bias towards Christian values 
within modern democracies.
 In the sections that follow, I shall challenge this position by presenting 
two alternative views on the secular state. "e #rst of these is Robert Post’s 
conception of the secular state, introducing the principle of democratic 
legitimacy. I shall #rst summarize his evaluation of arguments for and 
against limiting freedom of speech on religious issues, and subsequently 
compare Post’s position to the picture painted by Loose, evaluating to what 
extent Post’s arguments have been shaped by Christian (moral) standards, 
and to what extent expressions on both Christian and non-Christian religi-
osity may be evaluated di%erently using Post’s standards.
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 Subsequently, I shall discuss Ronald Dworkin’s distinction between the 
tolerant religious and the tolerant non-religious or secular state, attempt-
ing to evaluate to what extent western liberal democracy can be regarded 
as a tolerant secular state. Additionally, I shall investigate to what extent 
Dworkin’s position is compatible with Loose’s point of view, based on the 
various possible ways of connecting these two theories.
 In the #nal section of this paper, I shall present my conclusion on the 
validity of Loose’s argument. Based on this evaluation, I shall argue that 
free speech in Enlightened secular democracies is unconsciously biased 
towards the Christian faith at the expense of other religions, and that this 
is both unavoidable and undesirable given the current conceptions of state 
and democracy.
2. Donald Loose’s Criticism of Religious Neutrality
Donald Loose argues that Christianity cannot be eliminated from modern 
liberal democracy (Loose, 2007a). In order to understand this somewhat 
paradoxical statement, we need to #rst consider the history of liberal 
democracy.
 Loose reminds us of the great number of religious wars that took place 
in Europe, starting as early as the 11th century and culminating in both 
the French Revolution and the American War of Independence. "ese 
events gave rise to the founding of a secular state, which was capable of 
ending this religious strife by separating the public domain from citizens’ 
private spheres, while simultaneously maintaining strict neutrality towards 
the various warring religious factions within this public sphere (Loose, 
2007a: 20). By banning the dominance of any speci#c religious doctrine 
from the public sphere, this newly created nation state could e%ectively 
govern its people, despite irreversible religious heterogeneity within the 
private sphere.
 "e two most exemplary models of governing religion in the public 
domain within contemporary liberal democracies are the French policy 
of “laïcité’” and the American “marketplace of ideas”. "e French policy 
consists in severely limiting all explicit expressions of religion in public life, 
thus banishing religion in its entirety to the private sphere of the citizen. 
By contrast, the American policy is the exact opposite of this: by giving 
all religious expressions equal and unfettered opportunities for expression 
within the public forum, religious doctrines compete with one another 
like vendors in the marketplace, thus preventing any single religion from 
claiming the public sphere as its own. In practice, many states adopt a 
policy somewhere in between these two extremes.
 One problem Loose identi#es in these doctrines of the secular state 
is that it leans heavily on the (arti#cial) separation of public and private 
space. Religion, however, will not let itself be fully con#ned to the pri-
vate sphere, as evidenced by citizens’ increasing rebellion against this 
delineation: as Loose argues, citizens expect the social norms and moral 
convictions that apply in their private domain (which tend to be based 
on religious tenets) to be extended to public life (Loose, 2007a: 20). "is 
may be especially true for second-generation immigrants, who are shaped 
both as citizens in a secular state and as members of a (minority) religious 
community (Loose, 2007a: 32-33). In practice, these two identities may 
not always be reconcilable, resulting in friction and con!ict, both in the 
private and the public sphere. "is shows that religion cannot be totally 
banished from public life as in the French policy model, since by limiting 
religious expression in public life, citizenship runs the risk of becoming 
so restrictive that many citizens may feel excluded from it (Loose, 2007a: 
21-22).
 "e main fallacy in the reasoning of the secular state is thus the assump-
tion that all people are #rst citizens, who may subsequently subscribe to a 
religious ideology within the con#nes of their private lives. People never 
choose their religious background, however, as they are always shaped in a 
certain religious environment (or absence thereof ). For many, the require-
ment to discard or disregard their religious identity when they enter public 
life is simply not realistic, as it is their religious identity upon which their 
identity as citizens is founded. Loose (2007b: 141-142, 147-148) consid-
ers this especially true both for Islam, which focuses on individual piety 
without a uni#ed vision of the state, and for Judaism, which has doctrinal 
reasons for distancing itself from politics and thus citizenship.
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Although Loose (2007a: 20) explains that the separation between church 
and state originates in the modern conception of the state, the secular state’s 
attitude towards religion may itself be argued to have originated from its 
interaction not with religion in general, but speci#cally with Christianity, 
including both the claim to universality of the Roman-Catholic Church, 
and the Reformation, which arguably played a signi#cant part in bring-
ing about Enlightenment in Europe. A similar argument can be made for 
such secular values as justice, charity, tolerance, and favouring the meek 
(Loose, 2007b: 169). "ese are moral values grounded in Christianity that 
have been incorporated into Enlightenment, and subsequently adopted 
as Enlightenment values. "is illustrates that Enlightenment in Europe 
as a whole has been historically shaped against a background of Christian 
religious beliefs.
 "e secular state and its Enlightened values are thus a reminder of the 
Christian doctrine that is still implicitly present and prevalent in European 
culture, law and (political) thought. Loose strives for a greater awareness 
of the Christian roots of the secular state, for this may remind us that the 
neutrality of the secular liberal state is a more problematic position than it 
may be perceived to be at #rst glance.
 "is is the basis of the di$culty of the American policy model in 
adjudicating fair opportunities to all religious expressions in the public 
domain. For within this system, some religious expressions may be more 
disruptive and disturbing to prevalent and implicitly Christian secular val-
ues than others. In adjudicating these issues, the state is faced with the 
dilemma to either favour its own cultural history, thus compromising its 
neutrality, or to maintain its neutrality but to ignore its moral values, thus 
abandoning its claim to a secular morality (Loose, 2007b: 130-131).
 One #nal complication of the liberal, secular society is that it has an 
ideological drive to incorporate the totality of social reality, and thus to 
subjugate all social dealings to the divide between the public and the pri-
vate, including those elements that reject this liberalism itself. "is is an 
ideological strategy that is similar to the one traditionally employed by 
the Roman-Catholic church within the domain of faith: via the rhetorical 
claim that one given doctrine has universal validity, all opposing positions 
are implicitly reduced to subordinate variants of the universal doctrine.  
Loose argues that this claim of universal primacy of the divide between 
public and private is directly descended from the claim of universal pri-
macy of Roman-Catholic faith, and that therefore secular liberalism can 
be seen as an extension of Roman-Catholicism, revealing the secular soci-
ety as only one evolutionary step away from the Christian society. In the 
words of Loose: 
‘Whoever refrains from claiming e%orts towards the common good as 
one’s own exclusive patrimony out of a religious inspiration, proves at 
the same time that he or she acknowledges the autonomy of the secular 
and the religious, and is thus fundamentally marked by Christianity 
(Loose, 2007b: 130-131).’1
"is implies a more than signi#cant compatibility of the Christian faith 
with the secular state, and indeed raises the question whether non-Chris-
tian religions can be compatible with the secular state to a similar extent.
3. Robert Post’s !eory of Legitimate Democracy
"e next step in this investigation consists of reviewing a number of alter-
native theories on the relationship between religion and freedom of speech 
in modern secular societies, to test their compatibility with Loose’s posi-
tion, and to examine to what extent Loose’s argument remains tenable. 
"e #rst such position is presented by Robert Post (2007), who makes a 
clear delineation of the extent to which secular democratic governments 
should regulate or limit freedom of expression on religious issues.
 Post posits one major assumption, speci#cally that the secular societies 
under review are democracies, by which is meant a state in which citizens 
govern themselves, or as de#ned by Bobbio (1989) and quoted by Post 
(2007: 73): ‘Democratic forms of government are those in which the laws 
are made by the same people to whom they apply.’
 Post also identi#es a necessary condition for democracy, which is open 
public discussion. He argues that it is not enough for democratic self-
government if citizens merely shape the actions and behaviour of the state 
through collective decision-making; they must also identify with the state. 
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"is means that citizens must experience themselves not just as voters, but 
also as authors of the state and its laws. "e primary way to attain such 
authorship according to Post (2007: 75-76) is through public discussion, 
in which citizens may actively and collectively in!uence the state’s policies 
and decisions. Obviously, freedom of expression is a key condition for 
such public debate. Without su$cient liberty or opportunity to enter into 
public discussion, citizens become alienated from public policy and society 
may no longer be called democratic. For this reason, freedom of expression 
should be allowed as much space as possible in the public sphere.
 Applying this to the discussion of issues of faith and religion, it is clear 
that citizens must not only have the freedom to express their own religious 
faith and opinions, but also to express their opinions on other religions 
than their own. "e cost of this freedom, however, is that some of these 
opinions may be perceived as insults to those whose religion is the subject 
of public debate, creating the possibility of con!ict and polarisation in the 
public domain. 
 Post acknowledges that these costs will sometimes outweigh the ben-
e#ts of absolute freedom of expression. Consequently, he identi#es and 
outlines three arguments that have been used to limit these liberties in 
liberal democracies, and he evaluates each of these arguments’ practical 
value for actual public expressions of opinions on religions.
 "e #rst of these is the argument that religions should be protected 
from insult and blasphemy (Post 2007: 77-78). "is is a protection 
a%orded not to believers or religious groups, but to the religions and dei-
ties themselves. "e reasoning behind this argument is that certain sacred 
tenets of faith should never be de#led by denouncement or ridicule, as 
they are values that outweigh those of freedom and the state. Post argues 
that this limitation may have value in certain states, speci#cally those who 
only aspire to govern a people who homogenously accept the religious ten-
ets that are regarded as sacred. However, since most modern states do not 
have such a homogenous population, Post concludes that this limitation 
of free speech is mostly unacceptable.
 Secondly, Post (2007: 78-82) states the argument that religious groups 
should be protected from insult and humiliation. "is is di%erent from 
the previous argument in that it refers to the believers and the integrity of 
their religious feelings, and not to the sacredness of religion itself. What 
this argument entails in its purest form is that all members of society 
have a fundamental right not to be subjected to public insult, criticism 
or denouncement of the religious beliefs and practices they uphold. Since 
such a restriction silences any critical remarks on any religion, it e%ectively 
sti!es free public discourse on religious issues, thus endangering demo-
cratic legitimacy.
 As a result, a number of limitations of this broad ‘blanket ban’ on 
expression of opinion on religious issues exist. Post mentions the claim of 
general tolerance within democracies, and the condition of only excluding 
those opinions on religious issues that are gratuitously insulting and do 
not further public debate, only to subsequently counter them both. He 
argues that the aforementioned ‘spirit of general tolerance’ within democ-
racies should only apply to actions, not words, meaning that a democracy 
should only actively enforce citizens not to act contrary to social pub-
lic order (e.g. ‘[w]e must not riot or murder in defence of our beliefs’ 
(Post, 2007: 79-80)), while allowing them the right to insult their fellow 
citizens. And regarding the issue of gratuitous insults, he maintains that 
the criterion of ‘gratuitousness’ (and thus not furthering public debate) is 
too subjective to e%ectively apply to judging controversial expressions in 
a rational and objective way. He concludes that the argument of protect-
ing religious groups from insult is only valid in societies not committed 
to democratic legitimacy, or in speci#c cases where ‘keeping the religious 
peace’ is considered more important for social stability than the values of 
democracy (Post, 2007: 79-80).
 "e third and #nal limitation on free speech on religious issues Post 
(2007: 82-84) lists is the argument of preventing discrimination. Contrary 
to the previous argument, this refers to the social standing of speci#c reli-
gious groups, preventing them from being marginalised within society and 
public debate through (intentional) incitement of public opinion against 
them as a group. Post readily admits that the prevention of discrimination 
is a prerequisite of democratic legitimacy, as this is enhanced by a broad 
spectrum of participants/authors in public discussion. Alienating any (reli-
gious) group from public life detracts from the legitimacy of democracy. 
10
Erasmus Student Journal of Philosophy Sébastien de la Fosse | "e Paradox of Religious Neutrality
However, he also argues that this argument of silencing some in the name 
of equality should not be overused, in order to prevent the state from 
misusing it to protect the political interests of those in power, or to sti!e 
public discussion out of political correctness. Post therefore supplies two 
criteria for the justi#ed use of this restriction on freedom of speech: "e 
#rst of these is the condition that there be no plausible alternative for 
limiting citizens’ free speech in combating inequality and discrimination 
(such as education or a$rmative action). "e second criterion is the con-
dition that the o%ensive expressions would qualify as ‘hate speech’, i.e. 
they should have both the intent to discriminate, and a damaging e%ect 
to the discriminated parties. Post concludes that these conditions would 
ensure responsible use of the argument of preventing discrimination on 
religious and other issues.
 Post’s argumentation shows that in his theory of democracy, free 
speech should be given as much space as possible, and that it may only 
be restrained in exceptional circumstances. When overlaying this view 
with the picture provided by Donald Loose, it becomes apparent that 
Post is a proponent of what Loose calls the American policy on religious 
expression; Post advocates virtually no limitations on public discussion of 
religious matters, turning the public debate of religion into a “marketplace 
of ideas”. Despite the problems Loose has identi#ed with this position (i.e. 
the assumption of the supremacy of citizenship over religious identity, and 
the greater compatibility Christian values have with those of the secular 
state over the values of non-Christian religions), Post’s position can be 
complementary to his own: Post’s description of democracy legitimized by 
public debate can be used as a further clari#cation of Loose’s liberal secular 
state, while Loose’s analysis can be used as a test of the neutrality of Post’s 
model of democracy.
 A number of observations can be made from this combination. "e 
major issue that I shall discuss in the remainder of this section is that it 
appears plausible that Christian groups generally #t Post’s model of soci-
ety better than other religious groups. "is can be seen by recalling that 
Post’s Enlightenment value of democracy through self-governance relies 
on unfettered public discussion, while also minding Loose’s point that this 
Enlightenment value arose in Christian societies and has therefore been 
shaped in part by Christian values. I shall make this clear by reviewing 
Post’s three (countered) exceptions to freedom of expression on religious 
issues in light of this peculiar position of Christianity.
 "e argument of preventing blasphemy should not be applicable to 
modern secular democracies, since secular Enlightenment has replaced 
religion as the conceptual foundation of the state. Although Christian 
values still implicitly underlie Enlightened Reason, these are no longer 
embraced as the exclusive values of Christianity, but as belonging primari-
ly to Reason. Since these values are already protected as allegedly neutral 
elements of the secular state itself, no special protection is required for 
them as religious tenets.2
 However, because non-Christian religions maintain a set of sacred val-
ues that do not all coincide with those of Enlightened Reason, it may be 
the case that the sacredness of these religions is less widely acknowledged 
throughout society than that of Christianity, and that these religions are 
not treated with the same (unconscious and unrecognised) consideration 
as Christianity. In this way, non-Christian religions may be seen as disad-
vantaged in public debate as compared to Christianity.
 Post’s position on the second limiting argument, that of uncondition-
ally protecting believers from insult, is similarly biased towards Christianity. 
With regard to this issue, Post presupposes that insulting citizens in their 
religious identity does not necessarily damage their standing as citizens 
(which would be a breach of democratic legitimacy). "is assumption may 
hold for those citizens who are either non-religious or have a religious 
background – such as Christianity – that does not place the foundation 
of citizenship in religious values. However, for those citizens who adhere 
to a religious doctrine that does base the legitimacy of their citizenship 
on religious beliefs, Post’s assumption does not hold, causing Post’s posi-
tion to deny them any protection from attacks against the foundation of 
their civic legitimacy. What this shows is, again, the hidden premise of the 
divide between religion and public life, as identi#ed by Loose, once again 
unmasking the secular state as one built on Christian foundations.
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Many non-Christian religious groups, such as Muslims or Jews, derive 
the virtues of citizenship from their religious virtues. Indeed, such groups 
might argue from this point of view that a state that allows its citizens to 
insult and ridicule the beliefs (and thus the absolute virtue) of others could 
hardly be considered legitimate at all. However, by criticizing the implicit 
Christian bias in the secular state – and thus making a stand for a di%erent 
conception of citizenship – these groups risk being themselves accused of 
rejecting the principles of citizenship altogether.
 "e #nal argument Post reviews, the argument of preventing dis-
crimination, is less criticised than the other two, as Post more readily 
acknowledges its use, even though he warns of its overuse. At #rst glance, 
this balancing act between the right to express one’s opinion in public and 
the right to have one’s place in public life protected by law appears to be a 
truly neutral tenet, which does not favour Christians over non-Christians 
in any way. "e bias is still there, however, hidden in one of Post’s restric-
tions on the use of this argument, speci#cally the condition that both 
discriminatory intent on the part of the speaker and the damaging e%ect 
of the insult should be established. 
 An argument for this statement can be found with Jill Gordon and 
Markus Johnson (Gordon & Johnson, 2003), who argue that de#ning dis-
crimination3 as an intentional act is an injustice. "ey emphasize that it is 
not conscious discrimination, but unconscious discriminatory speech that 
is both most common and most harmful in excluding minority groups 
from public life. In their view, a better de#nition of discrimination would 
not include the speaker’s intent as a necessary condition, but would rather 
place more emphasis on the interlocutor’s a%ect in experiencing speech as 
discriminatory. In this light, it can be seen that Post utilizes a hidden prem-
ise in his limiting of the restrictions on free speech, which is the premise 
of innocence until proven guilty. Although this is an admirable value to 
maintain in determining objectively perceivable intentional acts, it may 
not be in the case of determining subjective perceptions and experiences. 
"e reason for this is that, in the case of possibly discriminatory or insult-
ing speech, the interlocutor is assigned the burden of proof to establish the 
speaker’s discriminatory or insulting intent, which typically requires access 
to the speaker’s private thoughts. "is makes it a nigh-impossible task for 
the interlocutor to meet the conditions for determining that he or she has 
been discriminated against.
 "e question remains whether or not this implicit assumption favours 
the Christian faith. In my opinion, this is often but not necessarily the 
case. Discrimination is a broad cultural phenomenon that is not merely 
limited to religious di%erences, but rather appears to be a near-universal 
(if unpleasant) characteristic of human culture and identity-shaping. It 
even appears to have a social function, in that it allows similar or like-
minded individuals to de#ne themselves as a group – or even a community 
– through opposition to others, while simultaneously de#ning the identity 
of these others in terms of the emerging newly-dominant community.4 
Because of this community-de#ning characteristic of discrimination, it 
can be argued that discriminatory speech tends to exclude minorities from 
a dominant majority.
 Applied to freedom of expression on religious issues, it can be seen 
that in secular democracies the majority generally favours Enlightenment 
values, which have a signi#cant overlap with the Christian values from 
which they evolved. What this means is that unintentionally discrimi-
natory speech tends to favour Christians over non-Christians, but only 
because Christian religious values are already dominant as a result of their 
overlap with Enlightenment values. "erefore, Post’s restrictions on silenc-
ing discriminatory speech does not in itself cause a secular society to favour 
Christianity over other religions, but does play a role in maintaining such 
inequality.
 "is discussion shows that an explicitly secular doctrine of democracy 
still harbours deep-seated Christian values and is therefore not truly neu-
tral in religious matters. Clearly, Post’s approach of using democracy and 
self-authorship as non-religious political values does not provide a defence 
against the implications of Loose’s claims.
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4. Ronald Dworkin’s Two Models of the Tolerant State
A di%erent approach to this discussion is Ronald Dworkin’s (2006) view 
on the democratic state. Dworkin distinguishes between two conceptions 
of modern democracies: the tolerant religious state and the tolerant secular 
state. He de#nes the tolerant religious state as ‘a religious nation, collec-
tively committed to the values of faith and worship, but with tolerance for 
religious minorities including nonbelievers’ (Dworkin, 2006: 56), while 
by contrast the tolerant secular state is conceived as ‘a nation committed 
to thoroughly secular government but with tolerance and accommodation 
for people of religious faith’ (ibidem). While the factor of tolerance is an 
important and fundamental similarity between these two conceptions of 
the state, Dworkin argues that the two models are still fundamentally dif-
ferent in their conception of citizenship, and additionally that the tolerant 
religious model is incoherent. In the following, I shall present Dworkin’s 
argument.
 "e similarity between the model of the tolerant religious state and 
the tolerant secular state is not merely the subscription to the ideal of 
tolerance, but also to two basic principles of human dignity. "ese are the 
principle that each person’s life is of equal intrinsic value, and the principle 
that every person has the same personal responsibility for their own life 
(Dworkin, 2006: 70). In applying these principles of the individual to 
society, Dworkin argues that society is only justi#ed to constrain citizens’ 
liberty ‘on sound distributive or sound impersonally judgmental grounds’ 
(Dworkin, 2006: 73). What is excluded from these is constraints on ‘per-
sonally judgmental grounds’, which Dworkin de#nes as ‘laws that violate 
dignity by usurping an individual’s responsibility for his own ethical val-
ues’ (Dworkin, 2006: 72), in other words paternalistic policies that impose 
moral values on citizens. Such measures would violate the principle of 
citizens’ responsibility for their own lives and should, in this account, be 
disallowed for that reason.
 However, Dworkin indicates that such personally judgmental poli-
cies are actually held within the tenets of the tolerant religious state, since 
such a state explicitly subscribes to certain religious principles and seeks 
to actively promote these through policy. "e tolerant religious state toler-
ates citizens’ choices not to subscribe to these principles, but it states that 
it would prefer them to. Dworkin concludes that this type of paternalism 
in the tolerant religious state is incompatible with the principles of human 
dignity that it claims to adhere to.
 Although this paternalism is a recognisable feature of the tolerant 
religious state, it is not, according to Dworkin, the main reason why 
the tolerant religious state is incompatible with the principles of dignity. 
Rather, it is its cultural majoritarianism, which is the circumstance within 
tolerant religious states where a majority of the population that shares cer-
tain religious values wishes to impose these on public life, not for the sake 
of the minority (which would be paternalism), but for the sake of their 
own ideal of public life. In e%ect, the religious majority shapes the public 
sphere according to their own religiously inspired values, converting these 
to civic values (Dworkin, 2006: 74). "is forces minority religious groups 
as well as nonbelievers to adopt these same values in order to function as 
citizens. "ese minorities are therefore still free to reject these values as 
their religious identity, as long as they acknowledge them as the prevalent 
doctrine in public life.
 Dworkin’s tolerant secular state, by contrast, does not impose any such 
values on its citizens. Instead, it takes pains to shape public life according 
to civic virtues that do not have a religious foundation. Applying his analy-
sis to the case of the United States of America, Dworkin concludes that 
American society actually shows more properties of a tolerant religious 
state, than of the tolerant secular state that it claims to be.
 When comparing Dworkin’s position to that of Donald Loose, it is 
unclear at #rst whether these two analyses are compatible, as is required in 
order to perform a meaningful comparison. In my opinion, there are three 
possible approaches to connecting these two positions. "e #rst two such 
approaches consist of applying Loose’s point to Dworkin’s tolerant secular 
state on the one hand, and applying it to Dworkin’s tolerant religious state 
on the other. "e third position is a more subtle one, requiring an altera-
tion of Dworkin’s model. I shall make a case for each of these approaches 
and subsequently compare the three scenarios.
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 "e #rst approach – applying Loose’s argument that the secular state 
is in!uenced by and biased towards Christian thought to Dworkin’s con-
ception of the tolerant secular state – implies that the tolerant secular state 
model is founded on Enlightenment values that implicitly grew from 
Christian values. If we then accept Loose’s analysis, we are led to a two-
fold conclusion. First, we can see that Dworkin’s review of the tolerant 
religious state is not relevant to this discussion, because this account of 
the state does not claim secular values as its foundation. Secondly, on this 
view, Dworkin’s distinction between a tolerant religious state and a toler-
ant secular state would be reduced to a distinction between an explicitly 
religious state and an implicitly religious one, making it next to mean-
ingless. E%ectively, Dworkin’s position has been undermined by Loose’s 
account through a claim to universality inherent in the chosen approach: 
by equating Loose’s argument of a pro-Christian bias in the secular state to 
Dworkin’s tolerant secular state, Dworkin’s position has been neutered and 
presented as a dissenting voice in Loose’s system. If I were to choose this 
approach to combine the two theories, this would amount to a decision 
on my part to reject the validity of Dworkin’s distinction. "is would go 
well beyond giving Loose’s position the bene#t of the doubt, and would 
amount to explicitly favouring it over Dworkin’s views, especially in light 
of the fact that this is not the only possible approach to relate these two 
viewpoints.
 An additional problem with this approach is that Loose’s description 
of the American policy on religious expression as a “marketplace of ideas” 
would become inaccurate, since Dworkin’s model reduces this American 
situation to either personally judgmental government policy to promote 
religiosity (in the United States as a tolerant religious state), or to one that 
tries to reduce religious expression in the public sphere more similar to 
the French policy of “laïcité” (within the picture of the United States as a 
tolerant secular state). Dworkin clearly prefers the latter.
 "e closest alternative to this scenario consists of applying Loose’s 
statements to Dworkin’s tolerant religious state. "is would provide more 
justi#cation for Loose’s description of the “marketplace of ideas” policy 
in its appeal to tolerance, against Dworkin’s denouncement of the reli-
gious core of American society. However, this view also o%ers a potential 
challenge to Loose’s claim that the secular state is predisposed towards 
Christian values, in that it leaves open the possibility that a secular state 
could be capable of maintaining a neutral position towards Christianity 
as compared to other religions. "e problem of the cultural dominance 
of implicit Christian values in public life is thus relegated to Dworkin’s 
tolerant religious state. However, this approach would not do Loose’s point 
justice, as it fails to explain in what way Dworkin’s tolerant secular state 
could overcome this challenge. "erefore, choosing this approach would 
enable Dworkin’s position to evade Loose’s points by stipulation, which 
would entail opposing Loose’s arguments through begging the question.
 As can be seen from these two separate attempts at comparing Loose’s 
and Dworkin’s respective positions on religion and public life, these posi-
tions remain incompatible to some extent, as Dworkin would argue that 
Loose’s analysis is inaccurate in stating that the American “marketplace of 
ideas” policy would #t the policy of a secular state, while Loose would deny 
that Dworkin’s distinction between a tolerant religious state and a tolerant 
secular state could be made in a meaningful way, because in his opinion 
secular societies are still subconsciously marked by (Christian) religious 
values. "is last consideration, however, provides the starting point for a 
third attempt to connect these two analyses.
 "e third approach to combining Loose’s and Dworkin’s theories 
requires a further distinction within Dworkin’s theory. Dworkin’s tolerant 
religious state and tolerant secular state both refer to a state’s conscious 
selection of its stance towards any or all religious doctrines. However, what 
I propose is to include not merely the conscious position of the state, but 
also the unconscious position of the public in a de#nition for Dworkin’s 
distinction between religious and secular. "is is an alteration inspired by 
the perception of discrimination raised by Jill Gordon & Markus Johnson 
(2003); if we exclude unconsciously discriminatory remarks from the de#-
nition of discrimination, this de#nition would be too narrow. Similarly, if 
we exclude unconsciously non-neutral opinions on religious issues from 
the state position of religious neutrality, this religious neutrality of the state 
cannot be considered complete.
 "e rami#cations of this interpretation are quite far-reaching for 
Dworkin’s model. It implies that Dworkin’s arguments are limited in their 
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application to political reality, as unconscious social undercurrents that 
draw on historically Christian cultural in!uences have given rise to an 
overly narrow conception of the secular state. More charitably, it can be 
said that Dworkin’s model is an idealization that leaves problems pertaining 
to the position of religion in public life unaddressed. "e resulting image is 
similar to the one painted by the #rst approach, in that it leaves Dworkin’s 
position with a signi#cant burden of proof, but it does not invalidate his 
distinction between the tolerant religious state and the tolerant secular 
state and still leaves a coherent view on the American “marketplace of 
ideas” policy.
 Based on the above investigation, the #rst two scenarios show a lim-
ited extent of compatibility between Loose and Dworkin, which would 
result in either subjugating one theory to the other for the sake of com-
patibility, or denying their compatibility altogether, rendering meaningful 
comparison impossible within this study’s parameters. "e third scenario, 
however, does not pose any serious limitations on the premises on either 
theory, although it does require some !exibility on the part of Dworkin’s 
assumptions. As a result, the (non-stipulated) possibility of an unbiased 
tolerant secular state and Loose’s claim of modern secular states’ predis-
position towards Christian values do not exclude one another. For this 
reason, this third approach allows for the greatest degree of compatibility 
between Loose’s and Dworkin’s respective positions, which in turn allows 
a meaningful evaluation of their validity, without resorting to judgements 
by stipulation. For this reason, I argue that this approach is the most fruit-
ful in terms of both academic impartiality and meaningfulness within the 
con#nes of this study. Finally, based on this approach to connect Loose’s 
and Dworkin’s respective positions, it can be concluded that Dworkin’s 
views do not meet the burden of proof required to disprove Loose’s argu-
ment.
5. Conclusion
"e investigations above have shown that Donald Loose’s deconstruc-
tion of the religious neutrality of the modern secular state poses serious 
problems for the conception of the secular state. Loose argues that secular 
democratic governments’ claim to religious neutrality is built on a founda-
tion of Christian beliefs and values, showing this position of neutrality to 
be tenuous at best. I have challenged this position with two alternatives, 
each of which needs to possess su$cient compatibility with Loose’s theory.
 Applying Loose’s analysis of the secular state to Robert Post’s concep-
tion of democracy as a political value, I have shown that Post leans heavily 
on the assumption of absolute religious neutrality, revealing that his argu-
ment for a mostly unrestricted freedom of expression in public discussion 
of religious issues does indeed favour the religious values of Christianity 
within this public debate over those of other religions. It should be noted, 
however, that this is not merely caused by the cultural history of the con-
cept of the secular state (as Loose argues), but it is also maintained through 
the systematic discounting of unconscious discrimination of minority 
opinions, a dynamic identi#ed by Jill Gordon & Markus Johnson, who 
argue that such disregard for unconscious considerations is a failing of cur-
rent theories of morality and justice.
 Dworkin’s distinction between the (tolerant) religious state and the 
(tolerant) secular state is a position that is partially incompatible with 
Loose’s views and requires a reinterpretation of at least one of the theories 
in order to make a meaningful comparison. Applying Gordon & John-
son’s distinction between conscious and unconscious discrimination to 
Dworkin’s conception of the tolerant secular state results in an image that 
presents Dworkin’s model as an idealized version of the conception of the 
state, which does not address the issue of unconsciously religious premises 
in the concept of the religiously neutral state. Dworkin thus models the 
ideals of the secular state rather than its real problems.
 Both challenges to Loose’s criticism of the secular state have there-
fore failed. For now, the claim that secular governments have a signi#cant 
inherent predisposition towards Christian values and opinions in their 
conception of the state stands. However, it is made clear by both Post and 
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Dworkin that a breach of religious neutrality on the part of the state is not 
desirable. As Post would argue, a state predisposition towards a certain 
religion would impose a severe limitation on public debate, resulting in 
a reduction of democratic legitimacy. Conversely, Dworkin would claim 
that a state that systematically favours certain religious views over others 
is not only paternalistic, but also culturally majoritarian, and violates the 
principles of human dignity. Surprisingly, Loose refrains from comment-
ing on the desirability of this situation, with the exception of his appeal for 
greater awareness within modern secular democracies of their own cultural 
and religious history. While this appeal may merely be meant to stimulate 
participants in public debate to become better informed on the nature of 
public life itself,5 it may also be taken by some as an implicit approval or 
justi#cation of the privileged position Christian values enjoy in modern 
western societies.
 What I have shown in this paper is twofold. On the one hand, free 
speech in modern secular democracies is inevitably and unconsciously 
biased towards the Christian faith at the expense of other religions. "is is 
in line with Loose’s position, which was not disproven through confronta-
tion with either Post’s or Dworkin’s respective alternative positions. On 
the other hand, however, I have shown that this bias is undesirable and 
unjust from the point of view of the modern secular state, as both Post and 
Dworkin argue. In addition, though, a further extrapolation of Gordon & 
Johnson’s argument provides an even more fundamental support for this 
conclusion: an exclusive focus on conscious intent of the speaker entails 
not only a passive disregard for the perceptions and interpretations of the 
interlocutor, but also for the unconscious biases of the speaker; both these 
disregards are injustices. Perhaps they are even inherent weaknesses of the 
very Enlightenment that is the foundation of the secular state.
 "e #nal remaining question is whether any possible solutions may 
still be found for this compromised religious neutrality of the non-reli-
gious state. Two possible strategies are available: on the one hand, societies 
may seek to foster awareness of the inherent !aw in their neutrality and 
seek to minimize it, while on the other hand the concept of democracy and 
the secular state could be rethought. "e former is a task for those political 
philosophers who subscribe to the ideals of Enlightenment, while the lat-
ter is best left to more unorthodox thinkers, as it requires a new conception 
of the state, of political thought, and of Enlightenment itself, preferably 
one that has no genealogical ties to Christianity. Perhaps the recent politi-
cal upheaval and subsequent tentative rise of democracy in some Middle 
Eastern and North African countries may (eventually) provide fuel for a 
new account of Enlightenment.
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Notes
1. I have translated this quote from Dutch for the purposes of this paper.
2. It should be noted that various secular democracies still maintain laws banning blas-
phemy. However, these laws are increasingly seen as a relic of the past and have come under 
examination for elimination. 
3. "e authors’ argument concerns racism, which is a speci#c form of discrimination. "e 
point, I believe, can also apply to all other forms of discrimination without losing any of 
its merit. Additionally, as will be seen in the following section, I shall apply this argument 
to a di%erent issue as well.
4. "is is an adaptation of the argument that one’s identity is de#ned through a naming act 
performed by another, developed by Butler (1997).
5. Donald Loose has embraced this interpretation in personal communication.
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